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Abstract. Foundations of Science recently published a rebut-
tal to a portion of our essay it published two years ago. The
author, G. Schubring, argues that our 2013 text treated unfairly
his 2005 book, Conflicts between generalization, rigor, and intu-
ition. He further argues that our attempt to show that Cauchy is
part of a long infinitesimalist tradition confuses text with context
and thereby misunderstands the significance of Cauchy’s use of in-
finitesimals. Here we defend our original analysis of various miscon-
ceptions and misinterpretations concerning the history of infinitesi-
mals and, in particular, the role of infinitesimals in Cauchy’s math-
ematics. We show that Schubring misinterprets Proclus, Leibniz,
and Klein on non-Archimedean issues, ignores the Jesuit context
of Moigno’s flawed critique of infinitesimals, and misrepresents,
to the point of caricature, the pioneering Cauchy scholarship of
D. Laugwitz.
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1. Introduction
In our article [B laszczyk, Katz & Sherry 2013] in the Foundations of
Science, we sought to place Cauchy’s work within an uninterrupted
line of an infinitesimalist tradition, and to vindicate his infinitesimal
definitions of concepts like continuity, convergence, and the Dirac delta
function (see also [Katz & Tall 2013]). We also sought to champion the
pioneering work of D. Laugwitz from the 1980s that challenges the re-
ceived views on Cauchy as a precursor of the Weierstrassian epsilontik.
We developed an approach to the history of analysis as evolving along
separate, and sometimes competing, tracks. These are the A-track,
based upon an Archimedean continuum; and B-track, based upon what
we called a Bernoullian (i.e., infinitesimal-enriched) continuum.
1.1. Punctiform and non-punctiform continua. Historians often
view the work in analysis from the 17th to the middle of the 19th
century as rooted in a background notion of continuum that is not
punctiform. This necessarily creates a tension with modern, punctiform
theories of the continuum, be it the A-type set-theoretic continuum
as developed by Cantor, Dedekind, Weierstrass, and others, or a B-
type continuum as developed by Hewitt,  Los´, Robinson, and others.
How can one escape a trap of presentism in interpreting the past from
the viewpoint of set-theoretic foundations commonly accepted today,
whether of type A or B?
In analyzing Cauchy’s work one must be careful to distinguish be-
tween its syntactic aspects, i.e., procedures and inferential moves, on
the one hand, and semantic aspects related to the actual construction
of the entities such as points of the continuum, i.e., issues of the ontol-
ogy of mathematical entities such as points. We found that in his work
on Cauchy, Laugwitz was careful not to attribute modern set-theoretic
constructions to work dating from before the heroic 1870s, and focused
instead of Cauchy’s procedures (see also Section 6.2).
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1.2. Rebuttals. In keeping with its tradition of fostering informed
debate, Foundations of Science recently published a response to a por-
tion of our essay. The author, G. Schubring, argues that our attempt
to show that Cauchy is part of a long infinitesimalist tradition con-
fuses text with context and thereby misunderstands the significance of
Cauchy’s use of infinitesimals. Schubring urges, instead, that Cauchy’s
intentions must be “reconstructed according to the contemporary con-
ceptual horizon of the related conceptual fields” [Schubring 2015, Sec-
tion 3].
He further insinuates that our analysis is “contrary to a style appro-
priate for a reasoned scientific discussion” (ibid., Section 5).
We grant that we dealt too briefly with Schubring’s treatment of
Cauchy. Here we develop more fully our thesis that the book Conflicts
[Schubring 2005]
(1) misinterprets both Leibniz and Felix Klein on infinitesimals;
(2) escapes the need of a genuine hermeneutical effort by ignoring
the historical context of Moigno’s flawed critique of infinitesi-
mals;
(3) underestimates the role of infinitesimals in Cauchy’s work;
(4) misrepresents Laugwitz’s Cauchy scholarship, e.g., by alleging
that Laugwitz tried to “prove” that Cauchy used hyper-real
numbers; and
(5) conflates Laugwitz’s analysis with D. Spalt’s.
The issue of modern interpretation of historical mathematics is a
deep and important one. Much recent scholarship has argued that
modern conceptions shed little light on historical mathematics. For
example, scholars have criticized late 19th and early 20th century at-
tempts to attribute a geometrical algebra to Euclid’s Elements (e.g., Sz-
abo 1969, Unguru 1975 and 1979). More recently the nonsequiturs and
unwarranted assumptions of these critiques have been brought to light
[Blasjo 2016], and the present article attempts to accomplish some-
thing similar. It continues a program of re-evaluation of the history of
mathematical analysis undertaken in [B laszczyk, Katz & Sherry 2013],
[Bair et al. 2013], [Bascelli et al. 2014], and other texts. Thus, we high-
light the significance of Simon Stevin’s approach to undending decimals
in [Katz & Katz 2012b]. The text [Katz, Schaps & Shnider 2013] re-
evaluates Fermat’s contribution to the genesis of the infinitesimal calcu-
lus via his technique of adequality. The articles [Katz & Sherry 2012],
[Katz & Sherry 2013], and [Sherry & Katz 2014] argue that Leibniz’s
theoretical strategy for dealing with infinitesimals was more soundly
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based than critiques by George Berkeley and others. Euler’s infini-
tesimal analysis is defended against A-track re-writings in the articles
[Kanovei, Katz & Sherry 2015] and [Bair et al. 2016] . Cauchy’s in-
finitesimal legacy is championed in the articles [Katz & Katz 2011],
[Borovik & Katz 2012], [Katz & Katz 2012a], [Tall & Katz 2014].
2. Conceptual horizons
Schubring has repeatedly emphasized the importance of context and
external history (as opposed to what he calls immanent history). We
may agree with Schubring that
The meaning [of Cauchy’s infinitesimals] has to be re-
constructed according to the contemporary conceptual
horizon of the related conceptual fields. Thus, a genuine
hermeneutical effort is inescapable. [Schubring 2015,
Section 3]
Indeed, Cauchy’s contemporary conceptual horizon needs to be taken
into account. However, it is equally true that the meaning of Cauchy’s
infinitesimals cannot be reconstructed, as Schubring attempts to do,
while at the same time ignoring the context of the broader conceptual
horizon that surely incorporated an awareness of Archimedean and
non-Archimedean issues stretching all the way back to Euclid.
We will show that Schubring misinterprets both Leibniz and Felix
Klein on both the Archimedean property and infinitesimals, and ends
up endorsing Moigno’s flawed critique of infinitesimals; see Sections 4.1
and 4.2. Moreover, Schubring himself ignores the contemporary histor-
ical context of Moigno’s critique; see Section 8.
3. Axioms for Archimedean quantities
The notion of infinitesimal is related to the axiom of Archimedes,
i.e., Euclid’s Elements, Definition V.4 (see [De Risi 2016, Section II.3]
for more details). The theory of magnitudes as developed in Book V of
the Elements can be formalized as an ordered additive semigroup M
with a total order, characterized by the five axioms given below.
[Beckmann 1967/1968] and [B laszczyk & Mro´wka 2013, pp. 101-122]
provide detailed sources for the axioms below in the primary source
(Euclid). See also [Mueller 1981, pp. 118-148] which mostly follows
Beckmann’s development. Axiom E1 below interprets Euclid V.4:
E1 (∀x, y ∈M)(∃n ∈ N)(nx > y),
E2 (∀x, y ∈M)(∃z ∈M)(x < y ⇒ x+ z = y),
E3 (∀x, y, z ∈M)(x < y ⇒ x+ z < y + z),
E4 (∀x ∈M)(∀n ∈ N)(∃y ∈M)(x = ny),
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E5 (∀x, y, z ∈M)(∃v ∈M)(x : y :: z : v).
4. Schubring’s pseudohistory
We find multiple problems with Schubring’s analysis of authors rang-
ing from Proclus and Leibniz to Moigno and Klein. Here we present
several examples.
4.1. Klein’s horn-angles misunderstood by Schubring. It is well
known that infinitesimals form a proper subset of a non-Archimedean
structure. Now to formulate what it might mean for a structure to be
NON-Archimedean, one needs first to make up one’s mind as to what
Archimedean itself might mean. Surprisingly, the book [Schubring 2005]
provides no formulation whatsoever concerning the so-called Archimedean
axiom1 (the term was introduced in [Stolz 1883]). More importantly,
Schubring’s remarks on Klein’s horn-angles reveal a misconception on
Schubring’s part concerning non-Archimedean systems:
[Felix] Klein has shown [sic] in detail that the horn-
like angles form a model of non-Archimedean quantities.
[Schubring 2005, p. 17]
But is that really what Klein had shown? In Klein’s approach, horn-
angles form an ordered structure isomorphic to R+ (when parametrized
by the curvature), which can hardly be said to be non-Archimedean.
Klein goes on to form a broader structure incorporating both horn-
angles and rectilinear angles. That structure is non-Archimedean (see
Section 3 for a discussion of the term), and a horn-angle constitutes
an infinitesimal within this structure. More precisely, a horn-angle is
an infinitesimal relative to rectilinear angles. Thus, it is incorrect to
assert, as Schubring does, that “hornlike angles form a model of non-
Archimedean quantities.” Klein writes:
Thus multiplication of the angle of a tangent circle [i.e.,
horn-angle] by an integer [n] always yields another an-
gle of a tangent circle, and every multiple n is necessar-
ily smaller, by our definition, than, say, the angle of a
fixed intersecting line, however large we take n. Thus
the axiom of Archimedes is not satisfied; and the angles
of tangent circles must be looked upon, accordingly, as
1On page 17, Schubring cites Proclus’ correct reading of Euclid V.4, but as
soon as Schubring attempts to paraphrase this in his own terms, he immediately
gets it wrong by describing infinitesimals in terms of incommensurability. The term
incommensurability is used to describe phenomena related to irrationality, including
both previous occurrences of the term in [Schubring 2005] on pages 12 and 16.
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actually infinitely small with respect to the angle of an
intersecting straight line. [Klein 1925, p. 205] (emphasis
added)
Thus, Klein’s horn-angles are only infinitely small with respect to rec-
tilinear angles. Schubring’s imperfect understanding of even the basic
issues involving infinitesimals leads to errors of judgment on his part
with regard to both Leibniz and Cauchy, as we show in Sections 4.2
and 4.3.
4.2. Leibniz’s infinitesimals misinterpreted by Schubring. A
quotation from Leibniz on infinitesimals in [Schubring 2005] is accom-
panied by the following claim:
[Leibniz] declared two homogeneous quantities to be equal
that differed only by a quantity that was arbitrarily
smaller than a finite quantity. [Schubring 2005, p. 169]
(emphasis added)
Schubring takes two homogeneous quantities x, y to be equal if their
difference x − y is a quantity that is arbitrarily smaller than a finite
quantity, or in symbols
x = y ⇐⇒ x− y < each finite quantity.
However, an infinitesimal itself is a finite quantity (i.e., it is not infi-
nite). How can it be smaller than each finite quantity? In other words,
how can a quantity be smaller than its own half, its own quarter, etc.?
There seems to be a logical inconsistency involved in Schubring’s sum-
mary of the definition of an infinitesimal. The inconsistency is iden-
tical to the one claimed by Moigno and endorsed by Schubring; see
Section 4.3.
In fact, Leibniz is guiltless here, and it is Schubring who misinterprets
Leibniz’s discussion of infinitesimals. Leibniz wrote:
I agree with Euclid Book V Definition 5 that only those
homogeneous quantities are comparable, of which the
one can become larger than the other if multiplied by a
number, that is, a finite number. I assert that entities,
whose difference is not such a quantity, are equal. [. . . ]
This is precisely what is meant by saying that the dif-
ference is smaller than any given quantity.2 (Leibniz as
quoted in [Schubring 2005, p. 169])
2Leibniz uses the term finite in his paraphrase of Euclid’s definition V.5 (or V.4,
as discussed in footnote 3), but here he is dealing with a finite integer n (which,
in modern terminology, is tending to infinity), so that nǫ always stays less than 1
thereby violating the Archimedean property, if ǫ is infinitesimal.
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This passages deals both with comparable quantities and infinitesimals,
but finite numbers appear only in Leibniz’s characterisation of compa-
rable quantities, not of infinitesimals. We interpret Leibniz’s reference
to Euclid V.5 as a reference to the Archimedean axiom3 (see Section 3).
The way Schubring uses finite quantity in his erroneous paraphrase
of Leibniz has the effect of endowing infinitesimals with contradictory
properties. Schubring’s erroneous paraphrase is not an isolated in-
cident, for it is consistent with his endorsement of Moigno’s flawed
critique of infinitesimals analyzed in Section 4.3.
4.3. Schubring endorsing Moigno. It is no accident that Schubring
gives a favorable evaluation of Moigno’s critique of the infinitely small.
Moigno wrote in the introduction to his 1840 book that infinitesimals
are contradictory, arguing that it is impossible for something be less
than its own half, its own quarter, etc. (see Section 8) Schubring en-
dorses Moigno’s critique of infinitesimals in the following terms:
[Moigno] not only fails to use [the infiniment petits ] as
a basic concept, but also even explains explicitly why
they are inappropriate as such. This makes Moigno the
first writer to pick apart the traditional claim in favor
of their purported simplicite´ [Schubring 2005, p. 445]
Attributing such alleged picking apart to Moigno involves a fundamen-
tal misunderstanding on Schubring’s part, closely related to his mis-
reading of Leibniz (see Section 4.2). Without properly understanding
infinitesimals first, a scholar can’t properly evaluate historical criti-
cisms of infinitesimals, either. Schubring similarly ignores an impor-
tant aspect of the relevant external history, namely the Jesuit context
of Moigno’s remarks on infinitesimals (see Section 8).
Given Schubring’s endorsement of Moigno’s claim that infinitesi-
mals are self-contradictory, it is no wonder that he should seek to save
Cauchy’s reputation by attempting to minimize the significance of in-
finitesimals in Cauchy’s work.
5. Schubring vs Laugwitz
Schubring’s analysis of Laugwitz’s Cauchy scholarship contains nu-
merous inaccuracies and misrepresentations.
3Leibniz lists number V.5 for Euclid’s definition instead of V.4. In some editions
of the Elements this definition does appear as V.5. Thus, [Euclid 1660] as translated
by Barrow in 1660 provides the following definition in V.V (the notation “V.V” is
from Barrow’s translation): Those numbers are said to have a ratio betwixt them,
which being multiplied may exceed one the other. For our interpretation of this, see
Section 3, Axiom E1.
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5.1. Were Cauchy’s theorems always correct? Schubring com-
ments as follows on Laugwitz’s work on Cauchy’s sum theorem (a se-
ries of continuous functions under suitable conditions converges to a
continuous function):
[Giusti’s 1984 article] spurred Laugwitz to even more
detailed attempts to banish the error and confirm that
Cauchy had used hyper-real numbers. On this basis, he
claims, the errors vanish and the theorems become cor-
rect, or, rather, they always were correct (see Laugwitz
1990, 21). [Schubring 2005, p. 432] (emphasis added)
Schubring is making two separate claims here:
(1) that Laugwitz sought to show that Cauchy used hyper-real
numbers; and
(2) that Laugwitz asserted that Cauchy’s sum theorem was always
correct (including its 1821 version in the Cours d’Analyse).
Claim (1) will be examined in Section 6. Here we will examine claim (2).
Did Laugwitz assert that the theorems were always correct? Let us
consider the relevant passage from Laugwitz’s text in Historia Mathe-
matica:
Rather late in his life Cauchy [1853] admitted that the
statement of his theorem (but not its proof) was incor-
rect : “Au reste, il est facile de voir comment on doit
modifier l’e´nonce´ du the´ore`me, pour qu’il n’y [ait] plus
lieu a` aucune exception” [Cauchy 1853, 31-32]. [Laugwitz 1987,
p. 265] (emphasis added)
Thus, Laugwitz acknowledges that the 1821 formulation of the sum
theorem was incorrect as stated, and moreover that Cauchy himself
had recognized its incorrectness. This is contrary to the claim con-
cerning Laugwitz’s position made by Schubring. Schubring’s claim
amounts to a misrepresentation - indeed a caricature - of Laugwitz’s po-
sition. Misrepresenting another scholar’s work is, in Schubring’s phrase,
“contrary to a style appropriate for a reasoned scientific discussion.”
[Schubring 2015, Section 5 ‘The Climax’] In addition, Schubring fre-
quently conflates Laugwitz’s position with that of D. Spalt.4 Spalt’s
analysis was already criticized in [Katz & Katz 2011].
4Schubring repeats the performance in 2015 when he claims: “I am analysing at
length the methodological approach of Laugwitz (and Spalt), which consists in at-
tributing to Cauchy (his) own ‘universe of discourse.’ ” [Schubring 2015, Section 3].
But Spalt’s approach is not identical to Laugwitz’s!
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5.2. Didactic component. Schubring makes the following three suc-
cessive claims concerning Laugwitz’s Cauchy scholarship:
(1) the controversy basically centers on such fundamental concepts
as continuity and convergence;
(2) Laugwitz himself talks about the ‘essentially didactic compo-
nents of the infinitesimals in Cauchy’ (ibid., 18) (cf. [Laugwitz 1990,
p. 18]);
(3) it is in textbooks that we find these basic terms and not in
isolated research memoirs
(see [Schubring 2005, p. 433]). Schubring’s claim (3) concerning ‘basic
terms’ apparently refers to the terms continuity, convergence, and in-
finitesimal that he mentioned earlier in (1) and (2). In his claim (3),
Schubring appears to assert that these terms are found only in Cauchy’s
textbooks rather than in Cauchy’s research memoirs. Schubring claims
that Laugwitz describes Cauchy’s infinitesimals as ‘essentially didac-
tic.’ Schubring does not cite the relevant sentence from Laugwitz, who
states:
Das Beispiel gibt Gelegenheit, auf die wesentlich di-
daktische Komponente des Infinitesimalen bei Cauchy
hinzuweisen. [Laugwitz 1990, p. 18]
This can be translated as follows:
The example affords us the opportunity to point out
the essentially didactic component of Cauchy’s infinites-
imals.
Laugwitz’s use of the singular Komponente suggests that, among other
components (i.e., aspects) of infinitesimals, there is also a didactic
component. Schubring makes it appear as if Laugwitz views Cauchy’s
infinitesimals as being limited to their didactic role (this interpreta-
tion is motivated by Schubring’s contention that Cauchy was forced
by a curricular committee to include infinitesimals in his textbook).
Schubring further reveals that he himself adheres to such a view when
he claims in (3) that Cauchy’s infinitesimals are found in textbooks but
not in research memoirs. We will now show that both of Schubring’s
positions are untenable.
Neither Schubring’s view of Cauchy’s infinitesimals as being limited
to their didactic role, nor Schubring’s interpretation of Laugwitz’s com-
ment stand up to scrutiny. Note that Schubring’s claim (3) amounts to
the extraordinary contention that Cauchy only used infinitesimals in
textbooks only but not in research articles, something Laugwitz never
claimed.
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Was Cauchy’s use of infinitesimals indeed limited to his textbooks,
as Schubring claims? Certainly not. The article [Cauchy 1853] on the
corrected version of the sum theorem is a research article. It deals with
a property closely related to uniform convergence of series of functions,
which was the cutting edge of research in analysis at the time.
The 1853 article happens to deal with all three notions that Schubring
mentions in this paragraph, namely, continuity, convergence, and in-
finitesimal. Indeed, continuity and convergence are mentioned already
in Cauchy’s title, while infinitesimals are exploited in the definition of
continuity given already at the beginning of the article:
. . . une fonction u de la variable re´elle x sera con-
tinue, entre deux limites donne´es de x, si, cette fonc-
tion admettant pour chaque valeur interme´diaire de x
une valeur unique et finie, un accroissement infiniment
petit attribue´ a` la variable produit toujours, entre les
limites dont il s’agit, un accroissement infiniment petit
de la fonction elle-meˆme.5 [Cauchy 1853] [emphasis on
infiniment petit added]
Furthermore, the 1853 version of the sum theorem cannot even be
formulated without infinitesimals, and Cauchy’s proof procedure uses
them in an essential way, as analyzed in [Laugwitz 1987, pp. 264-266].
Cauchy wrote many other research articles exploiting infinitesimals
in an essential way. An example is his memoir [Cauchy 1832], where he
expresses the length of a curve in terms of the average of its projections
to a variable axis. His proof procedure involves decomposing the curve
into infinitesimal portions and proving the result for each portion. This
article is considered by specialists in geometric probability to be a
foundational text in that field; see e.g., [Hyksˇova´ et al. 2012].6
Thus Schubring’s claim (3) to the effect that Cauchy’s infinitesimals
appear only in textbooks is not merely inaccurate, revealing an incom-
plete knowledge of the original documents on his part, but more im-
portantly it obscures the fundamental role of infinitesimals in Cauchy’s
thinking.
After mentioning the essentially didactic component of Cauchy’s in-
finitesimals in [Laugwitz 1990, p. 18], Laugwitz goes on to discuss the
5Translation: “A function u of a real variable x will be continuous between two
given bounds on x if this function, taking for each intermediate value of x a unique
finite value, an infinitely small increment given to the variable always produces,
between the bounds in question, an infinitely small increment of the function itself.”
6Another example of Cauchy’s use of infinitesimals in research is his foundational
text on elasticity [Cauchy 1823] where “un e´le´ment infiniment petit” is exploited
on page 302. The article is mentioned in [Freudenthal 1971, p. 378].
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corrected sum theorem three pages later, starting at the bottom of
page 21. Laugwitz was well aware that Cauchy’s infinitesimals are not
limited to their didactic function, contrary to Schubring’s claim (2).
Three years earlier, Laugwitz had discussed Cauchy’s corrected sum
theorem in detail in his article in Historia Mathematica [Laugwitz 1987,
pp. 264-266].
In conclusion, Schubring both misrepresents Laugwitz’s position on
Cauchy’s infinitesimals, and reveals his (Schubring’s) own misconcep-
tions regarding the latter.
6. Cauchy, Laugwitz, and hyperreal numbers
In this section we examine the relationship between Cauchy’s in-
finitesimals and modern infinitesimals as seen by Laugwitz, and the
related comments by Fraser, Grabiner, and Schubring.
6.1. Schubring–Grabiner spin on Cauchy and hyperreals. Schubring’s
opposition to Laugwitz’s interpretation of Cauchy found expression in
the following comment, already quoted in Section 5.1:
[Giusti’s article] spurred Laugwitz to even more detailed
attempts to banish the error and confirm that Cauchy
had used hyper-real numbers. On this basis, he claims,
the errors vanish and the theorems become correct, or,
rather, they always were correct (see Laugwitz 1990, 21).
[Schubring 2005, p. 432] (emphasis added)
The matter of Schubring’s misrepresentation of Laugwitz’s position
with the regard to the correctness of the statement of Cauchy’s the-
orems was already dealt with in Section 5.1. In this section, we will
examine Schubring’s contention that Laugwitz claimed that Cauchy
used the hyperreals. In this passage, Schubring is referring to the ar-
ticle [Laugwitz 1990], but he is most decidedly not quoting it. In fact,
there is no mention of the hyperreals on page 21 in [Laugwitz 1990],
contrary to Schubring’s claim. What we do find there is the following
comment:
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The “mistakes” show rather, as experimenta crucis that
one must understand Cauchy’s terms/definitions [Be-
griffe], in the spirit of the motto,7 in an infinitesimal-
mathematical sense. [Laugwitz 1990, p. 21] (translation
ours)
We fully endorse Laugwitz’s comment to the effect that Cauchy’s pro-
cedures must be understood in the sense of infinitesimal mathematics,
rather than paraphrased to fit the epsilontik mode. Note that we are
dealing with an author, namely Laugwitz, who published Cauchy stud-
ies in the leading periodicals Historia Mathematica [Laugwitz 1987]
and Archive for History of Exact Sciences [Laugwitz 1989].8 The idea
that Laugwitz would countenance a claim that Cauchy “had used
hyper-real numbers” whereas both the term hyper-real and the relevant
construction were not introduced by E. Hewitt until 1948 [Hewitt 1948,
p. 74], strikes us as far-fetched. Meanwhile, in a colorful us-against-
“them” circle-the-wagons passage, J. Grabiner opines that
[Schubring] effectively rebuts the partisans of nonstan-
dard analysis who wish to make Cauchy one of them,
using the work of Cauchy’s disciple the Abbe´ Moigno
to argue for Cauchy’s own intentions. [Grabiner 2006,
p. 415]. (emphasis added)
Grabiner’s comment betrays insufficient attention to the procedure/ontology
distinction, while her endorsement of Moigno’s critique of infinites-
imals is as preposterous as Schubring’s. Schubring indeed uses the
work of Moigno in an apparent attempt to refute infinitesimals (see
Section 4.3). Moigno’s confusion on the issue of infinitesimals is dealt
with in Section 8.
Contrary to Schubring’s claim, Laugwitz did not attribute 20th cen-
tury number systems to Cauchy. Rather, Laugwitz sought to under-
stand Cauchy’s inferential moves in terms of their modern proxies. May
we suggest that Schubring’s mocking misrepresentation of Laugwitz’s
position is, again, “contrary to a style appropriate for a reasoned sci-
entific discussion.” [Schubring 2015, Section 5 ‘The Climax’]
7Here Laugwitz is referring to Cauchy’s motto to the effect that “Mon but prin-
cipal a e´te´ de concilier la rigueur, dont je m’e´tais fait une loi dans mon Cours
d’analyse avec la simplicite´ que produit la consideration directe des quantite´s in-
finiment petites.”
8The fact that Laugwitz had published articles in leading periodicals does not
mean that he could not have said something wrong. However, it does suggest the
existence of a strawman aspect of Schubring’s claims against him.
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6.2. What charge is Laugwitz indicted on exactly? In the ab-
stract of his 1987 article in Historia Mathematica, Laugwitz is careful to
note that he interprets Cauchy’s sum theorem “with his [i.e., Cauchy’s]
own concepts”:
It is shown that the famous so-called errors of Cauchy
are correct theorems when interpreted with his own con-
cepts. [Laugwitz 1987, p. 258]
In the same abstract, Laugwitz goes on to emphasize:
No assumptions on uniformity or on nonstandard num-
bers are needed. (emphasis added)
Indeed, in section 7 on pages 264–266, Laugwitz gives a lucid discussion
of the sum theorem in terms of Cauchy’s infinitesimals, with not a whiff
of modern number systems. In particular this section does not men-
tion the article [Schmieden & Laugwitz 1958]. In a final section 15 en-
titled “Attempts toward theories of infinitesimals,” Laugwitz presents
a rather general discussion, with no specific reference to the sum the-
orem, of how one might formalize Cauchyan infinitesimals in modern
set-theoretic terms. A reference to [Schmieden & Laugwitz 1958] ap-
pears in this final section only. Thus, Laugwitz carefully distinguishes
between his analysis of Cauchy’s procedures, on the one hand, and
the ontological issues of possible implementations of infinitesimals in a
set-theoretic context, on the other.
Alas, all of Laugwitz’s precautions went for naught. In 2008, he
became a target of damaging innuendo in the updated version of The
Dictionary of Scientific Biography. Here C. Fraser writes as follows in
his article on Cauchy:
Laugwitz’s thesis is that certain of Cauchy’s results that
were criticized by later mathematicians are in fact valid
if one is willing to accept certain assumptions about
Cauchy’s understanding and use of infinitesimals. These
assumptions reflect a theory of analysis and infinitesi-
mals that was worked out by Laugwitz and . . . Schmieden
during the 1950s.9 [Fraser 2008, p. 76] (emphasis added)
9Fraser repeats the performance in 2015 when he claims that “Laugwitz, . . .
some two decades following the publication by Schmieden and him of the Ω-calculus
commenced to publish a series of articles arguing that their non-Archimedean for-
mulation of analysis is well suited to interpret Cauchy’s results on series and inte-
grals.” [Fraser 2015, p. 27]What Fraser fails to mention is that Laugwitz specifically
separated his analysis of Cauchy’s procedures from attempts to account ontologically
for Cauchy’s infinitesimals in modern terms.
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Fraser and Schubring both claim that Laugwitz’s interpretation of
Cauchy depends on assumptions that reflect a modern theory of in-
finitesimals. While Schubring charges Laugwitz with relying on Robin-
son’s hyperreals (see Section 6), Fraser’s indictment is based on the
Omega-theory of Schmieden–Laugwitz. Both Schubring and Fraser are
off the mark, as we showed above.
7. Of infinitesimals and limits
Schubring claims to distance himself from scholars like Grabiner, who
attribute to Cauchy a conceptual framework in the tradition of the great
triumvirate of Cantor, Dedekind, and Weierstrass (see [Boyer 1949,
p. 298]):
I am criticizing historiographical approaches like that
of Judith Grabiner where one sees epsilon-delta already
realized in Cauchy [Schubring 2015, Section 3].
Yet, when Schubring explains the so-called ‘compromise concept’ that
he attributes to Cauchy, the infinitely small is governed by a conception
of limits in the context of ordinary (real) values. While Schubring
is not guilty, like Grabiner, of ignoring the role of infinitesimals in
Cauchy’s thinking, it is clear that Schubring believes that it is the limit
concept, rather than the infinitesimal concept that is primary in this
relationship. A more detailed analysis of such a Cauchy–Weierstrass
tale appears in [Borovik & Katz 2012].
Schubring’s section (6.4), discussing the connection between limits
and the infinitely small, reveals that Schubring is a cheerleader for the
triumvirate team. Thus, he writes that the infinitely small is “sub-
jugated to . . . the limit concept” [Schubring 2005, p. 454] (emphasis
added); furthermore, “the infiniment petits represent only a subcon-
cept of the limite concept in Cauchy’s textbooks” [Schubring 2005,
p. 455]. Both claims seem to be based on Cauchy’s remark that “a
variable of this type has zero as a limit.” However, this comment in
Cauchy is not truly a part of the definition of an infinitesimal, but
rather a consequence of the definition which precedes it.
8. Indivisibles banned by the Jesuits
Most scholars agree that infinitesimal analysis was a natural out-
growth of the indivisibilist techniques as developed by Galileo and
Cavalieri, and in fact Galileo’s work may be closer to the infinitesimal
techniques of their contemporary Kepler.10 Indivisibles were perceived
10Note that the term infinitesimal itself was not coined until the 1670s, by either
Mercator or Leibniz; see [Leibniz 1699, p. 63].
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as a theological threat and opposed on doctrinal grounds in the 17th
century [Feingold 2003]. The opposition was spearheaded by clerics
and more specifically by the Jesuits. Tracts opposing indivisibles were
composed by Jesuits Paul Guldin, Mario Bettini, and Andre´ Tacquet
[Redondi 1987, p. 291]. P. Mancosu writes:
Guldin is taking Cavalieri to be composing the contin-
uum out of indivisibles, a position rejected by the Aris-
totelian orthodoxy as having atomistic implications. . . .
Against Cavalieri’s proposition that “all the lines” and
“all the planes” are magnitudes - they admit of ratios
- Guldin argues that “all the lines . . . of both figures
are infinite; but an infinite has no proportion or ratio to
another infinite.” [Mancosu 1996, p. 54]
Tacquet for his part declared that the method of indivisibles “makes
war upon geometry to such an extent, that if it is not to destroy it, it
must itself be destroyed.” [Alexander 2014]
In 1632 (the year Galileo was summoned to stand trial over heliocen-
trism) the Society’s Revisors General led by Jacob Bidermann banned
teaching indivisibles in their colleges [Festa 1990], [Festa 1992, p. 198].
Referring to this ban, Feingold notes:
Six months later, General Vitelleschi formulated his strong
opposition to mathematical atomism in a letter he dis-
patched to Ignace Cappon in Dole: “As regards the
opinion on quantity made up of indivisibles, I have al-
ready written to the Provinces many times that it is in
no way approved by me and up to now I have allowed
nobody to propose it or defend it. If it has ever been ex-
plained or defended, it was done without my knowledge.
Rather, I demonstrated clearly to Cardinal Giovanni de
Lugo himself that I did not wish our members to treat
or disseminate that opinion.” [Feingold 2003, p. 28-29]
(emphasis added)
Indivisibles were placed on the Society’s list of permanently banned
doctrines in 1651 [Hellyer 1996]. In the 18th century, most Jesuit
mathematicians adhered to the methods of Euclidean geometry (to
the exclusion of the new infinitesimal methods):
. . . le grand nombre des mathe´maticiens de [l’Ordre] resta
jusqu’a` la fin du XVIIIe sie`cle profonde´ment attache´ aux
me´thodes euclidiennes. [Bosmans 1927, p. 77]
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Echoes of such bans were still heard in the 19th century. Thus, in 1840,
Moigno wrote:
In effect, either these magnitudes, smaller than any given
magnitude, still have substance and are divisible, or they
are simple and indivisible: in the first case their exis-
tence is a chimera,11 since, necessarily greater than their
half, their quarter, etc., they are not actually less than
any given magnitude; in the second hypothesis, they are
no longer mathematical magnitudes, but take on this
quality, this would renounce the idea of the continuum
divisible to infinity, a necessary and fundamental point
of departure of all the mathematical sciences . . . (as
quoted in [Schubring 2005, p. 456]) [emphasis added]
It is to be noted that Moigno formulates his objections to infinitesimals
specifically in the terminology of indivisible/divisible which had been
obsolete for nearly two centuries. Moigno saw a contradiction where
there is none. Indeed, an infinitesimal is smaller than any assignable,
or given magnitude; and has been so at least since Leibniz.12 Thus,
infinitesimals need not be less than “their half, their quarter, etc.,”
because the latter are not given/assignable.
In fact, Moigno’s dichotomy is reminiscient of the dichotomy con-
tained in a critique of Galileo’s indivisibles penned by Moigno’s fellow
Jesuit Orazio Grassi some three centuries earlier. P. Redondi summa-
rizes it as follows:
As for light - composed according to Galileo of indivis-
ible atoms, more mathematical than physical - in this
case, logical contradictions arise. Such indivisible atoms
must be finite or infinite. if they are finite, mathematical
difficulties would arise. If they are infinite, one runs into
all the paradoxes of the separation to infinity which had
11Moigno’s chimerical anti-infinitesimal thread has not remained without mod-
ern French adherents; see [Kanovei et al. 2013].
12Leibniz’s dichotomy between assignable and inassignable quantity, on which
his concept of infinitesimal was based, finds a rigorous mathematical treatment
in the hyperreal number system (where an assignable number is a standard real
number). Yet the mathematics of earlier times allowed an adequate intuitive un-
derstanding of the issue, sufficient to effectively and fruitfully use infinitesimals
in mathematical practice, even though a semantic base (accounting for the ontol-
ogy of a number) acceptable by modern standards was as yet unavailable. For
further details on Leibniz’s theoretical strategy in dealing with infinitesimals see
[Katz & Sherry 2012], [Katz & Sherry 2013], [Sherry & Katz 2014].
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already caused Aristotle to discard the atomist theory
. . . [Redondi 1987, p. 196].
This criticism appeared in the first edition of Grassi’s book Ratio pon-
derum librae et simbellae, published in Paris in 1626. According to
Redondi, this criticism of Grassi’s
exhumed a discounted argument, copied word-for-word
from almost any scholastic philosophy textbook. . . .
The Jesuit mathematician [Paul] Guldin, great oppo-
nent of the geometry of indivisibles, and an excellent
Roman friend of [Orazio] Grassi, must have dissuaded
him from repeating such obvious objections. Thus the
second edition of the Ratio, the Neapolitan edition of
1627, omitted as superfluous the whole section on indi-
visibles. [Redondi 1987, p. 197].
Alas, unlike Father Grassi, Father Moigno had no Paul Guldin to
dissuade him. Schubring fails to take into account the pertinent Je-
suit background of Moigno’s rhetorical flourishes against infinitesimals.
Schubring’s endorsement (see Section 4.3) of Moigno’s myopic anti-
infinitesimal stance is nothing short of comical.
While we agree with Schubring on the importance of considering con-
text, we observe that he fails to consider the Jesuit context of Moigno’s
flawed critique. Schubring seeks to exploit Moigno’s text in trying to
prove a point about Cauchy. However, escaping the need of a gen-
uine hermeneutic effort, Schubring ignores the context of Moigno’s still
being a Jesuit at the time he wrote his 1840 text.
9. Gilain on records from the Ecole
Cauchy wrote in the introduction to his 1821 Cours d’Analyse:
In speaking of the continuity of functions, I could not
dispense with a treatment of the principal properties
of infinitely small quantities, properties which serve as
the foundation of the infinitesimal calculus. (translation
from [Bradley & Sandifer 2009])
When Cauchy writes that he was unable to dispense with infinitesimals,
was he complaining about being forced to teach infinitesimals, or was he
emphasizing the crucial importance of infinitesimals? [Schubring 2005,
p. 436] asserts that Cauchy is complaining. Schubring bases his claim
on the context of Gilain’s analysis of teaching records from the Ecole
in [Gilain 1989]. However, Gilain makes the following points:
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(1) Unlike Cauchy’s later textbooks, his 1821 book was not commis-
sioned by the Ecole but was rather written upon the personal
request of Laplace and Poisson.
(2) When the portion of the curriculum devoted to Analyse Alge´brique
was reduced in 1825, Cauchy insisted on placing the topic of
continuous functions [and therefore also the topic of infinitesi-
mals exploited in Cauchy’s definition of continuity] at the be-
ginning of the Differential Calculus.
Thus, Gilain writes:
. . . rien ne montre, dans les documents utilise´s, qu’il y
ait eu une hostilite´ de principe de la part de Cauchy a`
la suppression de l’analyse alge´brique, en tant que par-
tie autonome situe´e au de´but du cours d’analyse. Ce qui
lui importait, par contre, c’e´tait la pre´sence de plusieurs
articles de cette partie, et les me´thodes utilise´es pour
les pre´senter. . . . Notons, sur deux points importants
pour Cauchy, que les fonctions continues sont place´es au
de´but du calcul diffe´rentiel et que l’e´tude de la conver-
gence des se´ries trouve sa place au voisinage de la for-
mule de Taylor, dans le calcul diffe´rentiel et inte´gral.13
[Gilain 1989, end of § 131]
The fact that Cauchy insisted on retaining continuity/infinitesimals
in 1825, as Gilain documents, indicates that the importance of in-
finitesimals to Cauchy goes beyond their pedagogical value. Also, the
fact that the Cours d’Analyse was written on personal request from
Poisson and others, rather than being commissioned by the Ecole, in-
dicates that the pressures of the type Schubring claims are unlikely to
have played a role in the writing of this particular book.
Later texts were indeed commissioned by the Ecole, but in 1821
Cauchy was free to write as he felt, and he felt that infinitesimals
were of crucial importance for analysis. In painting a dim picture
of Cauchy’s attitude toward infinitesimals, Schubring misjudges the
historical context of the Cours d’Analyse and ignores the fact that
13Translation: “Nothing indicates, in the documents used, any principled hostil-
ity on the part of Cauchy to the elimination of algebraic analysis as an autonomous
part placed at the beginning of the analysis course. What was important to him,
on the other hand, was the presence of several items from this part, and the meth-
ods used in presenting them. . . . Note two particular points important to Cauchy,
namely that continuous functions be placed at the beginning of differential calculus,
and that the study of the convergence of series should find its place in the vicinity
of Taylor’s formula, in differential and integral calculus.”
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decades after finishing his teaching stint at the Ecole, Cauchy exploits
infinitesimals in an essential way in his research article [Cauchy 1853].
10. Conclusion
Shoddy scholarship sometimes parades under the dual banner of so-
phisticated historiographic analysis and genuine hermeneutical effort.
As we have shown, Schubring’s “sophisticated historiographical analy-
sis” [Schubring 2015, Section 5 ‘The Climax’] collapses in the face of
simple historical facts and straightforward mathematical arguments.
Moreover, Schubring’s repeated misrepresentation of Laugwitz’s posi-
tion is indeed “contrary to a style appropriate for a reasoned scientific
discussion.” (ibid.)
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